Public Employee Collective Bargaining
Contracts: The Chicago Teachers
A question of current interest in Illinois is whether the Chicago Board
of Education has the power to bind itself under the provisions of a
collective bargaining contract with a union representing school board
employees.1 The Board is a municipal body2 and like other such bodies
has only those powers which are delegated to it by state statutes. The
power to enter into a collective bargaining contract with a labor union
must be either expressly granted by statute or implicit in the Board's
enabling legislation.3 There is no general legislation in Illinois dealing
with the power of public employers to enter into collective bargaining
contracts, and the School Code of 1961,4 the Board's enabling legislation, does not expressly grant such power. Thus, if the Board has this
power, it must be inferred from the School Code.
Since no Illinois appellate court has ever passed on the collective bargaining authority of the Board or any other municipal body and since
decisions from other jurisdictions on implied authority vary widely,5
1 The Chicago affiliate of the National Education Association and an intervening
taxpayer are presently seeking to enjoin the Board from entering into an exclusive
collective bargaining contract with the local affiliate of the American Federation of
Teachers. See Petition of James D. Broman for Leave to Intervene, Chicago Div. Illinois
Oct.
Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., Equity No. 65 CH 5524, Cook County Cir. Ct., Ill.,
10, 1965. In the Circuit Court the complaints of both the NEA affiliate and the taxpayer
1966. Both are appealing.
were dismissed. See Opinion and Decree, id.,
2 See Stowell v. Prentiss, 323 Ill. 309, 319, 154 N.E. 120, 123 (1926).
3 "[T]he powers of a municipal corporation include (1) powers expressly conferred
by the constitution, statutes, or charter; (2) powers necessarily or fairly implied in, or
incident to, the powers expressly granted; and (3) powers essential to the declared objects
and purposes of the municipality .... This enumeration of power is exclusive and no
other powers exist ...." 2 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 10.09 (3d ed. 1949).
See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Schultz, 341 Ill. 208, 173 N.E. 276 (1930); Sullivan v. Cloe,
277 Ill. 56, 115 N.E. 135 (1917). The power of municipal bodies to contract is similarly
limited. RHYNE, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS 27 (1952); 10 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 29.05 (3d ed. 1949).
4 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122 (1965). Although this comment specifically deals only with
the Chicago Board of Education, the analysis is in large part applicable to other Illinois
municipal bodies.
5 Holding that authority exists: Local 266, International Bhd. of Electrical Workers v.
Salt River Agricultural Improvement and Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393 (1954)
(emphasizing "proprietary" character of Improvement and Power District); Local 611,
International Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. Town of Farmington, 75 N.M. 393, 405 P.2d
233 (1965) (employees of electric utility). Holding that authority does not exist: Operat-
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an examination of the legislative intent underlying the School Code
of 1961 is necessary. If no clear intent is revealed, it will be necessary
to explore the possibility of inferring power simply because of the
Board's need for such power. 6 Analysis of other matters which the
courts have considered may also prove helpful: whether entering into
a collective bargaining contract constitutes an illegal "delegation of
power"; whether municipal collective bargaining agreements violate
the prohibition against binding future administrations unreasonably;
and whether exclusive representation provisions in municipal contracts
violate the equal protection and right to petition clauses of the
7
Constitution.
ing Eng'rs v. Water Works Board, 276 Ala. 462, 163 So. 2d 619 (1964) (water works
employees); City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Building Council, 94 Cal. App. 2d 36,
210 P.2d 305 (1949) (construction workers on public water facilities); Fellows v. LaTronica,
151 Colo. 300, 377 P.2d 547 (1962) (firemen); Dade County v. Amalgamated Ass'n of
Street Employees, 157 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1963) (transit workers); Mugford v. Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1946) (street cleaners and other
employees); City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 589 (1947) (sanitation
employees); City of Cleveland v. Division 268 Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees,
30 Ohio Op. 395 (C.P. 1945) (transit workers).
6 See notes 24-28 infra and accompanying text.
7 The right of teachers to strike is not at issue in this comment. It is assumed that
teachers' strikes are illegal. See notes 29 & 33 infra. It is also assumed that teachers'
unionization is permissible. If teachers were not legally permitted to unionize, it would
follow that contracts made by their unions would be invalid, but no legislation appears
to prohibit their unionization. In fact, legislation proscribing unionization among any
kind of municipal employees is virtually nonexistent, and it seems unlikely that courts
would judicially impose such a prohibition. See City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo.
1239, 206 S.W.2d 539, 542 (1947); Chapin v. Board of Educ., No. 21255, Peoria Cir. Ct.,
Ill., Dec. 9, 1939, cited in RHYNE, LABOR UNIONS AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYE LAw 157-58
(1946).
It should be emphasized that it is the power, not the duty, of the Board which is at
issue. The question of the Board's authority to enter into a collective bargaining contract
is raised only after it decides it wishes to enter such an agreement. Employers who are
within the scope of the National Labor Relations Act or similar state legislation have
not only the power but also the duty to bargain collectively and to agree to exclusive
representation. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 101, 61 Stat. 143
(1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 159(a) (1964). See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 150A, § 4(5)
(1965). But public employment is specifically excluded from the coverage of the National
Labor Relations Act and most similar state legislation. Labor-Management Relations
Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 101, 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1964); see, e.g.,
MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 150A, § 2(2) (1965). Even in those states where public employment
is not explicitly excluded from coverage it is generally excluded by construction according
to the principle "that labor laws generally will not be construed as affecting public
employment . . . unless the intent to cover public employment is clear." 1962 ILLINOIS
ArTORNFY GENR..'s REPORT AND OPINIONS 239. A few state labor statutes, however,
expressly apply to public employment. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.51-58 (Supp. 1965).
For other discussions of collective bargaining among teachers see Seitz, Rights of School
Teacher to Engage in Labor Organization Activities, 44 MAQ. L. Rxv. 36 (1960); Wildman, Collective Action by Public School Teachers, 18 IND. & LAB. REL. R.v. 3 (1964);
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NECESSARILY OR FAIRLY IMPLIED

The Illinois School Code of 1961, in the sections granting authority
to the Chicago Board of Education, provides:
The board shall exercise general supervision and management of . . . the public school system of the city, and shall

have power:
(1) To make suitable provision for the establishment and
maintenance .. of schools ....

The specifications of the powers herein granted are not to be
construed as exclusive, but the board shall also exercise all
other powers that may be requisite or proper to the maintenance and development of the public school system. ....
.

The School Code further provides that the Board shall have the power,
"subject to the limitations of this Article, to . . employ teachers and
other educational employees and fix their compensation." 9 It could be
argued that power to bargain collectively is "requisite and proper to
the maintenance and development of the public school system," and
that the power to employ and to fix compensation implies power to do
so through collective bargaining as well as by other means. Presumably, if the terms of employment or procedures for arriving at them
were prescribed by statute, then the methods and results of collective
bargaining might not be substituted; 10 moreover, if the statute preempted most matters otherwise appropriate for collective bargaining,
a legislative intent to withhold authority to bargain collectively might
be indicated. However, none of the areas of negotiation apparently
Wildman, Implications of Teacher Bargainingfor School Administration, 1964 PHI DELTA
KAPPAN 152. On collective bargaining among municipal employees generally see Anderson, Labor Relations in

the Public Service, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 601; Cornell, Collective

Bargaining by Public Employee Groups, 107 U. PA. L. R.v. 43 (1958); Note, Union Activity in Public Employment, 55 COLUm. L. Rv. 343 (1955); Note, Labor Relations in
the Public Service, 75 HARv. L. Rv. 891 (1961); Note, Municipal Employment Relations
in Wisconsin: The Extension of Private Labor Relations Devices into Public Employment, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 671. Of special interest in Illinois are Strayhorn, Municipal
Employees and the Law, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 377; Sullivan, Labor Problems in Public
Employment, 41 ILL. B.J. 432 (1953).
8

ILL. Ray.

STAT.

ch. 122,

§

34-18 (1965).

9 Ibid. The limitations referred to include age limits, standards for continued professional growth and good health of employees, and certain minimum compensation levels.
10 The Arizona Supreme Court stated this principle with respect to civil service
systems: "If a civil service scheme provides for the regulation of matters normally
contained in a collective bargaining agreement the conflicting terms of both could not

exist concurrently. The inconsistency would be resolved in favor of the statute." Local
266, International Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 30, 36, 275 P.2d 393, 397 (1954).
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contemplated for the Chicago Board's contract are precluded by statute. Although specific provisions have yet to be negotiated, the contract
is expected to deal with working conditions, salaries and fringe benefits, and "other professional problems" and to provide for exclusive
representation by one union." The Chicago Board of Education would
not be precluded by statute from including in a collective bargaining
contract clauses like those agreed to by the New York City Board of
Education in 1962. The New York contract provided for reduction of
instructional load, increases in specialized services, teacher aids, reduction of work day for certain classes of teachers, reduction in class size,
relief from non-teaching chores, definition of teacher assignments, rotation, program preferences, the application of seniority to substitutes,
leaves of absence, vacations, sabbaticals, pensions and retirement, 12 and
salary schedules. 13
One approach to determining whether the General Assembly in
enacting the Board's enabling legislation intended impliedly to authorize collective bargaining is to examine the Assembly's treatment
of other collective bargaining legislation. General legislation empowering municipal bodies to enter into collective bargaining contracts
has been unsuccessfully proposed in nearly every session of the General Assembly since 1945.24 But consistent failure to pass such general
legislation need not indicate that the General Assembly intended in
1961,15 when it passed the School Code, that the Chicago Board of
11 See Petition of James D. Broman for Leave to Intervene, supra note 1.
An exclusive representation provision ordinarily requires the employer to recognize or
bargain with the union representing a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit
and with no other union, permits a representative of the majority union to be present
at any grievance proceeding, and guarantees the union such privileges as access to certain
records and the opportunity to observe employment conditions. See RHYNE, op. cit. supra
note 7, at 426-524; Cornell, supra note 7, at 58-59.
12 The area of pensions and retirement would seem to be pre-empted by ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 108b, §§ 17-101 to 17-159 (1965).
13 See Wildman, Collective Actions by Public School Teachers, 18 IND. & LAB. REL.
R1v. 3, 9 (1964). For examples of collective bargaining contracts entered into by other
boards of education see AMtERIC:AN FEDER4*rioN OF TEACHERs, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
CONTRACTS (1962). For contracts entered into by other municipal bodies see RHYNE, Op. Cit.
supra note 7, at 426-524; Cornell, supra note 7, at 58-59.
14 LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BuREAu,

SYNOPSIS

AND DIGEST

OF THE GENERAL

ASSEMBLY,

STATE OF ILLINOIS, yrs. 1945-1965.

15 The relevant year for determining intent is the year of enactment. Arnold v. City
of Chicago, 387 Ill. 532, 56 N.E.2d 795 (1944). It has been suggested that re-enactments
without substantial change may be ignored. See Note, 43 CALIF. L. Rxv. 905, 908 (1955).
Although in the School Code of 1961 no significant changes were made in the particular
sections from which collective bargaining power might be inferred, it is reasonable to
assume, because there was considerable rearrangement throughout the Code (see Hutson,
Introduction to the School Code of 1961, in ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122 (Smith-Hurd 1962)),
that the General Assembly reconsidered the language of the relevant sections in 1961
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Education should not have collective bargaining power. 16 The Assembly might simply have been unwilling to give blanket express approval for collective bargaining to all types of municipal bodies. In
creating the Chicago Transit Authority, the General Assembly did
7
specifically empower it to enter into collective bargaining agreements,1
but this does not necessarily indicate a legislative intent that such
power should not exist unless granted expressly. It is not unlikely
that the legislature was concerned that any question relating to the
collective bargaining power of the Transit Authority be clearly and
immediately settled, since the Transit Authority was faced with the
peculiar problem of acquiring private enterprises staffed with employees accustomed to the benefits of collective bargaining.' 8 The several reasonable yet irreconcilable explanations of the legislature's
treatment of collective bargaining legislation prevent that treatment
from providing any clear indication of legislative intent.
Another possible approach to determining legislative intent would

be to examine prior judicial and non-judicial interpretations of similar statutes in Illinois and other jurisdictions and to assume that the
legislature was aware of those interpretations and intended its statute
to be similarly interpreted. Such an approach, however, is not helpful
in construing the School Code of 1961. While a few school board collective bargaining contracts were in existence before 1961,19 no court
had occasion to consider seriously their legal validity" and it was not
clear whether the parties to those contracts expected them to be leand that it is the intent of the legislature in 1961 which should be used to determine
the existence of implied collective bargaining power.
16 Legislation authorizing municipal collective bargaining has been passed in each of
the sessions in which it has been brought to a vote in either body of the General Assembly. Such legislation was passed by the House and postponed in the Senate in 1963
and was passed by both the Senate and the House before being vetoed by the Governor
in 1945. LEG.ISLATrVE REREcE BuREAu, LEGisLATrvE SYNoPsIs AND DIGEST OF TnE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY, STATE OF ILLINOIS, yrs. 1945, 1963.
17 The Transit Authority has power to execute collective bargaining contracts and to
submit disputes over wages, salaries, working conditions, and retirement and pension
provisions to binding arbitration. ILL. Ray. STAT. ch. 1112, § 328a (1965).
18 That the legislature was aware of the existence of collective bargaining benefits in
private companies and was concerned about the problems of the transfer is evidenced
by the requirement in the statute that seniority credit be given the employees in accordance with the terms of the labor agreements of acquired companies. ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
111l, § 329 (1965).
19 For instance, locals of the American Federation of Teachers had contracts with the
school boards of Eau Claire, Wisconsin, and Proviso Township, Illinois. See AMmUCAN
FEDERATION OF TEACHERs, COLLECrwVE BARGAINING CoNTRACrs (1962).
20 See Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 486 (1951)
(a declaratory judgment suit which went no further than to say some negotiations would
be permissible).
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gally valid or merely morally binding. Regarding municipal bodies
other than school boards, the Arizona Supreme Court has held a collective bargaining contract valid,2' while appellate courts in three
other states have held to the contrary. 22 The passage in a few other
states of legislation specifically approving collective bargaining by municipal bodies may have appeared to the Illinois General Assembly
to represent a judgment by other legislatures that enabling legislation
similar to that of the Chicago Board of Education could not be interpreted to imply collective bargaining power, but it may also have been
viewed merely as an attempt to clarify existing collective bargaining
power or to extend collective bargaining power to additional bodies.
Absent any clear indication as to whether the General Assembly
intended to imply collective bargaining power in the School Code,
such power may be inferred if sufficiently necessary for the accomplishment of the Board's purposes or the implementation of expressly
delegated powers such as the power to provide for the maintenance
of the schools, the power to employ, and the power to fix compensation. 23 It seems impossible to abstract from the Illinois cases a meaningful standard of sufficient need. The apparently conflicting formulas
offered by the courts-"essential,"' 24 "indispensable," 25 "not absolutely
indispensable," 26 and "reasonably necessary" 2 7-- provide little guidance
as to the quantum of need actually required to justify the inference
of municipal powers, while the holdings of the cases themselves suggest little more than a standard which fluctuates between dire necessity and mere convenience. 28 In the absence of a clear judicial con21 Local 266, International Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393 (1954).
22 City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Building Council, 94 Cal. App. 2d 36, 210 P.2d
305 (1949); Mugford v. City of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1945); City of
Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947).
23 See notes 8 & 9 supra.
24 City of Chicago v. Schultz, 341 Ill. 208, 210, 173 N.E. 276, 277 (1930).
25

Ibid.

26 People ex rel. Sweitzer v. City of Chicago, 363 Ill. 409, 414, 2 N.E.2d 330, 333
(1936); Houston v. Village of Maywood, 11 Ill. App. 2d 433, 437, 138 N.E.2d 37, 39 (1956).
27 City of Chicago v. Schultz, 341 Ill. 208, 212, 173 N.E. 276, 277 (1930); Potson v.
City of Chicago, 304 Ill. 222, 226, 136 N.E. 594, 596 (1922).
28 Powers have been held not implied in the following situations: (1) Power to pass
an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of handbills and circulars is not implied by
a city's power to regulate its streets or from its general police power. City of Chicago v.
Schultz, 341 Ill. 208, 173 N.E. 276 (1930). (2) Power to pass an ordinance requiring the
licensing of electricians and the inspection of electrical installations is not implied in
such express municipal powers as the power to prevent the dangerous construction of
chimneys, fireplaces, hearths, stoves, etc., although such implied power might be "not
only salutary but necessary." Arms v. City of Chicago, 314 Ill. 316, 325-26, 145 N.E. 407,
411 (1924). (3) Power to regulate "garages" does not imply power to regulate "private
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sensus, examination of the Board's need for collective bargaining
authority suggests that a court would be acting reasonably whether
it did or did not find that need sufficient to justify the inference of
implied power.
The only disadvantage of collective bargaining to the Board appears
to be the risk of being bound for a period of time to contractual terms
to which it need not now agree and which might prove unexpectedly
undesirable if the Board's needs were to change or if the market price
of labor were to decline. 29
garages," although denial of such power might be inimical to the public welfare. Crerar
Clinch Coal Co. v. City of Chicago, 341 Ill. 471, 477, 173 N.E. 484, 486 (1930). (4) Power
to regulate "ordinaries" and "coffee houses" does not imply power to regulate restaurants.
Potson v. City of Chicago, 804 Ill.
222, 186 N.E. 594 (1922). (5) A city's authority to perform the proprietary function of maintaining a water supply does not imply power to
contract to supply water for fifty years to a state educational institution in exchange for
five dollars and a promise that the institution would be located near the city limits.
Eastern Illinois State Normal School v. City of Charleston, 271 Ill. 602, 111 N.E. 573
(1916). (6) A city's general contracting power does not imply a power to take an assignment from a developer of the obligations owed by the residents of his development.
City of Marquette Heights v. vrell, 22 Ill.
App. 2d 254, 160 N.E.2d 598 (1959).
Powers have been held to be implied in the following situations: (1) Power to regulate
"Homes" and "Nursing Homes" with respect to ventilation, fire prevention provisions
and sanitation, and power to license such institutions, is implied in a city's police power.
Father Basil's Lodge, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 893 Ill.
246, 65 N.E.2d 805 (1946). (2) Power
to operate a nursery outside its limits is implied in a city's express power to create
and regulate parks although the needed shrubs could have been purchased rather than
grown. People ex tel. Sweitzer v. City of Chicago, 363 Ill. 409, 2 N.E.2d 30 (1936).
(8) A forest preserve board has implied power to annex its forest preserve district to
an adjacent village because this would lead to the most svccessful and efficient management of the district's property. Houston v. Village of Maywood, 11 Ill. App. 2d 43, 138
N.E.2d 37 (1956). (4) A city's power to bind itself to pay for an accountant is implied
in its mayor's power to examine the books, records, and papers of any office of the city.
Ward v. City of Du Quoin, 173 Ill.
App. 515 (1912). (5) Its express power to contract
gives a drainage district implied power to consent by stipulation to a decree binding
it to build a levee and lock and to dredge a channel. People ex rel. Stead v. Spring Lake
Drainage & Levee Dist., 253 Ill.
479, 97 N.E. 1042 (1912).
29 A provision for arbitration over new contractual terms might be treated differently
from the other provisions of a collective bargaining contract on the ground that it
would expose the Board to the special risk of being bound to terms to which it might
never have consented. Thus, even where a power to bargain collectively existed, power
to agree to arbitrate new contractual terms might be denied. See the opinion of the
court in Chicago Div. Illinois Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., supra note 1, suggesting
that the Board of Education's collective bargaining contract must leave the final determination of all disputes to the Board.
The implied grant of a power to bargain collectively need not deprive the Board of
its power to have strikes enjoined or create a right to strike on the part of public
employees. Strikes interrupt public service, while collective bargaining does not. Although
without the right to strike employees would be without an important weapon for pressuring the municipal body to accede to favorable terms, and to perform those terms
once they had been incorporated into a contract, employees would not be left powerless,
since they might be able to secure favorable terms by enlisting public support against

1966]

Public Enployee Collective Bargaining Contracts

The advantages of collective bargaining power appear to stem from
the reduction in harmful teacher discontent which such power might
make possible. Teachers might be less discontented with substantive
terms of employment if their own representative had negotiated for
and signed an agreement providing for such terms, and the granting
of collective bargaining privileges might reduce teacher discontent
simply because it would give the teachers something they desire. The
desire of teachers for collective bargaining privileges was clearly manifested by their threat to strike to obtain such privileges in the fall of
1965 as well as by their current collective bargaining requests. 30 Strikes
among other municipal employees3' make it clear that collective bargaining has become an important issue in public employment.
The granting of collective bargaining privileges appears less disadvantageous to the Board than any alternative compensation which
would equally satisfy the teachers. This economy seems less likely in
light of the possibility of obtaining a clear judicial decision denying
collective bargaining power, since such a decision might eleminate
the employer, and they can enforce contractual terms in the courts. Weber v. Nasser,
286 Pac. 1074 (Cal. App. 1930) (union awarded specific performance on employer's contract to maintain minimum size of orchestras in theater); Gregg v. Starks, 188 Ky. 834,
224 S.W. 459 (1920) (employee held entitled to injunctive relief in a seniority dispute);
Nyman v. Barber, 80 Ill. App. 2d 351, 174 N.E.2d 702 (1961) (abstract published) (carpenters union member awarded damages for breach of collective bargaining agreement
between union and contractor); Note, 26 ILL. L. RFv. 922 (1932); cf. Labor-Management
Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301, 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
30 See Petition of James D. Broman for Leave to Intervene, supra note 1. A court
might find it more difficult to believe that teachers have a serious desire for collective
bargaining than to believe that employees with unionized counterparts in private industry have such a desire. Courts may have this distinction in mind when they ascribe their
validation of collective bargaining contracts to the fact that the employees concerned
performed "proprietary" rather than "governmental" functions. See, e.g., Local 266, International Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and
Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393 (1954) (employees of an improvement and power
district); Local 611, International Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. Town of Farmington, 75
N.M. 393, 405 P.2d 233 (1955) (employees of an electric utility). But see City of Cleveland v.
Division 268, Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees, 30 Ohio Op. 395 (C.P. 1945) (refusing to attach any significance to the distinction). However, in addition to the strike
threat, the high degree of unionization of the teachers indicates that they strongly desire
many of the union privileges of private employees. In December, 1965, the Chicago
Teachers' Union, local affiliate of the American Federation of Teachers, had 13,503
members. In June, 1965, the Chicago Education Association, local affiliate of the National
Education Association, had 3,238 members. During the 1964-65 school year the Board of
Education employed approximately 22,640 teachers. These figures are on record at the
Chicago headquarters of the respective organizations.
31 E.g., Board of Educ. of Community Unit School Dist. No. 2 v. Redding, 32 I11. 2d
567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965) (school maintenance employees); Weakley County Municipal
Elec. Sys. v. Vick, 43 Tenn. App. 524, 309 S.W.2d 792 (1957). See also Chicago Daily
News, March 24, 1966, p. 1, col. 8 (teacher strikes in Calumet City and Lansing, Illinois);
id., May 11, 1966, p. 1, col. 8 (Cook County public aid workers' strike).
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resentment toward the Board which may exist presently as a result of
an appearance that the Board can give collective bargaining privileges
at virtually no cost to itself, but simply refuses to do so. However,
even recognizing the possibility of a clear judicial decision with such
an effect, the conferring of collective bargaining privileges with accompanying contractual security and opportunity to participate in decision making would appear considerably less expensive in most situations than alternative means of compensating the teachers.
If discontent is not eliminated by some alternative form of compensation, it could cause such harmful effects as inefficient teacher performance, personnel recruitment difficulties 3 2 and strikes. 33 Although
a strike resulting from teacher discontent could be enjoined,3 4 an injunction could be violated and the Board might be understandably
reluctant to jail violators because of political interests, fear of creating
an interminable deadlock, and the problems-more serious with teachers than with some other municipal employees-of replacing jailed
workers.3 5 A strike, in addition to halting school operations, would
diminish student respect for teachers, administrators, or both.36 Examination of the Board's situation, then, reveals a need for collective bargaining power which would justify a court, in light of previous
decisions, in finding that the Board has collective bargaining power.
A court inclined to find the Board's need sufficient to imply collective bargaining power should not be deterred, as some courts passing on municipal collective bargaining contracts have been, 37 by view32 See generally the statement of policy in the Eau Claire Contract referred to in
note 19 supra.
33 E.g., Board of Educ. of Community Unit School Dist. No. 2 v. Redding, 32 Ill. 2d
567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965) (school maintenance employees); Local 976, International Bhd.
of Electrical Workers v. Grand River Dam Authority, 292 P.2d 1018 (Okla. 1956) (electrical workers); City of Pawtucket v. Local 930, Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance, 87 R.I. 864,
141 A.2d 624 (1958) (teachers).
34 See cases cited note 33 supra.
35 Note, Labor Relations in the Public Service, 75 HARv. L. Rx v. 391, 896-97 (1961);
see also Mm=urr, MANAGEMENT IN THE PUBLIC SERvicE 303-04 (1954). The problems of
enforcing an injunction are demonstrated by the experiences of New York City during
the recent transit strike. See Time, Jan. 14, 1966, p. 27; N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1966, § 4,
p. 1E, col. 6. The New York legislature, fearing a second transit strike, passed a special
law avoiding the three year wage freeze required by New York's law against government
employee strikes. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1966, § 1, p. 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Feb. 16,
1966, § 1, p. 1, col. 5.
36 Seitz, sura note 7, at 42.
37 See City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Building Council, 94 Cial. App. 2d 36, 210
P.2d 805 (1949); Fellows v. LaTronica, 151 Colo. 300, 377 P.2d 547 (1962); Dade County
v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees, 157 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Ct. App. 1963) (per
curiam), appeal dismissed, 166 So. 2d 149 (Fla.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 971 (1964); Mugford v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1945); City of
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ing such contracts as impermissible "delegations of power." Courts
have not explained what is meant by "delegation," 38 but if, as appears
likely, "delegation" consists of the municipal body's binding itself and
thereby limiting its freedom of action in the future, it is identical
with "contracting," which has the same binding effect.3 9 Other types
of contracts have frequently been sustained as proper exercises of implied power.40 Seen in this light, the belief that a municipality can
never bind itself is mistaken and the "delegation" label should not
defeat any contract for which power would otherwise be implied.
Although "delegation" should pose no obstacle to a court willing to
Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947). But see two cases upholding
collective bargaining contracts despite an apparent awareness of the "delegation" objection: Local 266, International Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 80, 275 P.2d 393 (1954); Local 611, International Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. Town of Farmington, 75 N.M. 393, 405 P.2d 233
(1965).
38 A typical statement is: "To the extent that they [matters of wages, hours, and
working conditions] . . . are left to the discretion of any City department or agency,
the City authorities cannot delegate or abdicate their continuing discretion. Any exercise
of such discretion is at all times subject to change or revocation in the exercise of the
same discretion." Mugford v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44
A.2d 745 (1945).
39 However, the courts may be concerned with an entirely different problem when
they employ the "delegation" label to strike down collective bargaining -contracts. "Delegation" may refer to the giving of power to the majority union to bargain for members
and non-members alike. The courts may fear that this power will be used to discriminate
against non-members. But the school board, since its responsibility is public and its
actions are highly newsworthy, is less likely than a private employer to agree to terms
which are patently discriminatory. In addition, courts could require the majority union
to give fair representation to all employees, as is required of majority representatives
protected by the National Railway Labor Act and the National Labor Relations Act.
Syres v. Local 23, Oil Workers Int'l Union, 350 U.S. 892, reversing 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir.
1955); Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323
US. 192 (1943). The rationale of those cases, that the union assumes the duty to represent all employees when it uses the authority of the Act to become their exclusive
representative, could be applied to a union taking advantage of the authority granted
by state statute to become the exclusive representative of a municipal body's employees.
See Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 ViLL. L. R.v. 151 (1957). If the courts find
they have no power to impose such a requirement, they might, rather than invalidating
all municipal collective bargaining contracts, sustain only those contracts which include
a clause requiring fair representation of all employees.
40 Mayor of Washington v. Faver, 155 Ga. 670, 117 S.E. 653 (1923) (contract binding
city to pay county for the paving of roads contracted out by county); People ex rel.
Stead v. Spring Lake Drainage & Levee Dist., 252 Il1. 479, 97 N.E. 1042 (1912); Ward v.
City of Du Quoin, 173 Ill. App. 515 (1912); Boyce v. City of Gastonia, 227 N.C. 139, 41
S.E.2d 255 (1947) (franchise to street railway permitting railway to determine width of
its right of way); Robinson v. City of Philadelphia, 400 Pa. 80, 161 A.2d 1 (1960) (contract
between city and two universities for the operation of hospitals); Bernstein v. City of
Pittsburgh, 366 Pa. 200, 77 A.2d 452 (1951) (lease giving private opera association power
over program presented, admission charges, and allocation of maintenance costs in public

auditorium).
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infer the power to bargain collectively, several principles which might
limit collective bargainifig power deserve attention.
II.

LIMITING PRINCIPLES

Binding a Future Administration
A contract binding the Chicago Board of Education beyond the
contracting officers' term of office would not only prevent those officers
from making subsequent adjustments taking into account increased
experience and unexpected needs, but would render at least temporarily ineffectual any public pressure exerted on the selection of successors. While a few cases suggest that any such contract by a municipal
body is illegal,41 a more practical view which also finds judicial support 42 is that such a contract may be valid if made in good faith and

if its duration beyond the contracting officers' term of office is
"prompted by the necessities of the situation." 43 A contract might
properly extend beyond the contracting officers' term if that term were
of far shorter duration than that involved in the usual collective bargaining contract in public employment. Unreasonable limitation on
the duration of a contract might expose the municipal body to the
discontent of workers who believe they have received inadequate security and to the expense of negotiating a new contract in the near
future. However, since members are appointed to the Chicago Board
of Education only once a year,44 it appears that a contract exceeding
the term of all its members would be unjustified.
Equal Protection
Several courts have suggested that exclusive representation provisions of municipal collective bargaining contracts may deny to minority employees or their unions the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, but the nature of the abridgment is never made completely
41 E.g., City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947), invalidating
a collective bargaining contract and stating, inter alia: "[O]f course, no legislature could
bind itself or its successor to make or continue any legislative act." Id. at 1251, 206 S.W.2d

at 545.
42 Tate v. School Dist., 324 Mo. 477, 23 S.W.2d 1013 (1929) (teacher employment contract); American Federation of State Employees of Philadelphia, 83 Pa. D. & C. 537 (C.P.
1953) (collective bargaining contract).
43 Id. at 559.
44 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 34-3 (1965). The members of the Board are appointed by
the Mayor with the approval of the City Council. Thus, the effect of the public is only
indirect and it is only this effect which would be abridged by a contract extending beyond
one year.

1966]

Public Employee Collective Bargaining Contracts

clear. An Ohio court has suggested that "no such law permitting
a public board or body to designate one organization as exclusive
bargaining agency has been enacted, because its unconstitutionality
would be beyond question."4 5 The court referred to the fourteenth
amendment clauses regarding the abridgment of privileges and immunities and the denial of equal protection and then stated that an intention that employees should stand on an equal basis "would be
violated by according to some employees the right to bargain collectively ... through representatives of their own choosing, while deny-

ing that right to others through exclusive recognition of one union. ' 46
On the other hand, in Civil Service Forum v. New York City Transit
Authority47 a minority union contended that a municipal collective
bargaining contract excluding it from representing its members in
grievance proceedings discriminated in favor of majority unions and
gave such unions "preferential advantages" over the minority union
and its members, thereby depriving them of "equal protection of the
laws." The New York Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating
that such a contract was more efficient than separate contracts with
each union and was within "the broad powers conferred upon the
Authority." 48
There would appear to be no denial of equal protection to the
unions49 since a "majority union" can receive reasonable special treat45 City of Cleveland v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees, 30 Ohio Op. 395, 408
(C.P. 1945). By the same reasoning, abridgment of the equal protection guaranteed by
the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments would occur under the
exclusive representation provisions of the National Labor Relations Act and state labor
statutes. However, the constitutionality of those provisions is not doubted.
It should be noted that a taxpayer, as opposed to a minority employee, or a minority
union, might not have standing to raise the equal protection and the right to petition
questions, because he could show no injury to his rights. However, he might establish
standing to oppose a collective bargaining contract by asserting that the contract would
raise labor costs and thereby raise taxes. Golden v. City of Flora, 408 III. 129, 96 N.E.2d
506 (1951). Once a taxpayer's standing is established, a court might examine the equal
protection and right to petition questions on its own motion. See 1 DAvis, ADM'NmSrATivE
LAW TREATzE § 22.07 (1953).
48 City of Cleveland v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees, 30 Ohio Op. 395, 407
(C.P. 1945) (quoting with approval from intervening minority union's brief). See also
the lower court decision in Mugford v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 9 CCH
Lab. Cas. 66996, 67000 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1944), 9 MUN. L.J. 118, 119 (1944), stating that "such
preferences" as those embodied in an exclusive representative provision "are forbidden
in the public service."
47 4 A.D.2d 117, 163 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1957), aJJ'd, 4 N.Y.2d 866, 150 N.E.2d 705, 174 N.Y.S.

2d 234 (1958).
Id. at 125; 163 N.Y.S.2d at 484.
Conceivably a court could hold that a union, if it is only an association, is not a
"person" entitled to equal protection. An unincorporated union is not a citizen entitled
to either the rights guaranteed by the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth
48

49
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ment if such treatment is for a legitimate municipal purpose. 50 Collective bargaining can be expected to serve the legitimate purpose of
minimizing teacher discontent, and exclusive representation may be
the cheapest and most effective means to bargain collectively. In both
negotiations and grievance proceedings an employer saves time and
simplifies procedure by conferring with only one union. Agreement
may be expedited when each party has become familiar with the interests and techniques of the other. Compromise is more likely when
a union knows that if it yields on some points, it, rather than a rival
union, will be the recipient of the employer's corresponding. concessions and the resulting appreciation of the employees.
The same considerations suggest that members of minority unions
are not denied equal protection by exclusive representation. Assuming
that the majority union will be required by the courts or the contract
to represent all emiloyees fairly,5 ' the minority employees would suf-

fer only in that their preference for a particular representative would
not prevail. The sacrifice of the minority employees' interests, like the

sacrifice of the more substantial interests of the minority unions, would
not appear to constitute an illegal abridgment of equal protection.
In fact, even if the courts should be unable to impose, a duty of fair
representation on the majority union, the resulting danger to the in-

terests of the minority employees under an exclusive representation
provision might be justified by the desirability of quick and inexpensive settlement with employees.52
amendment, Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 514 (1939), or the right to assert diversity of
citizenship, United Steelworkers of America v. R. H. Bouligmy, Inc., 382 U.S. 145 (1965).
But corporations are entitled to equal protection rights, Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee,
288 U.S. 517 (1933); Santa Clara Co. v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886), and the
Supreme Court, without discussing the question of standing, passed on the merits of an
equal protection question raised by unincorporated unions in Alabama State Federation
of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450 (1945).
50 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (state may favor one group over another
if not arbitrary).
51 See note 39 supra.
52 Some courts have noted an argument against municipal collective bargaining based
on the statement that "the government is established and operated for all the people
and not for the benefit of any person or group." Local 611, International Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. Town of Farmington, 75 N.M. 393, 395, 405 P.2d 233, 235 (1965).
Though this proposition is never explained, it may well be based on notions about
equal treatment between employees and the remainder of the public rather than among
employees or among unions. The argument may be that equal protection is denied when
public employees are permitted to have their gains protected in contracts while other
interest groups are not. The answer to this is that public employees have a different
relationship with the government than do interest groups which are denied contracts
and are forced to rely, for instance, on lobbying. Public employees are in a business
relationship with the municipal government and give considerations for the government's
binding promises. Other interest groups, such as building contractors who have business
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The Right to Petition
The first amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable
to the states through the fourteenth amendment, 53 provides: "Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people . . .
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for the redress
of grievances." An exclusive representation provision in a municipal
collective bargaining contract stating that the employer will negotiate
only with the majority union may be thought to limit the constitutional right of the non-members to petition the municipal body, their
employer. 54 A related and more troublesome question is raised in the
unusual situation where a contract provides that the municipal body
will engage in grievance proceedings with the majority union or individual employees but not with minority groups. Such a provision was
examined by the New York Supreme Court in Civil Service Forum v.
New York City Transit Authority 5 and the contention that it violated
the right to petition was rejected without discussion. It would seem
that the right to petition applies to both individuals and groups; 56 the
right might create a duty on the part of the government to give petitions some attention, if only to read them.57 A contract forbidding the
government to give even such minimum attention to minority petitions thus might be unconstitutional. Even if this contention were
accepted, however, the state could constitutionally deny a minority
group access to any grievance proceeding which involved more than
an opportunity simply to state a complaint. The right to petition
surely does not include, for instance, the right to a series of appeals
and eventual arbitration. Furthermore, no court has suggested that it
is unconstitutional for the government to refuse to negotiate at all
relationships with the municipal government, receive contractual protection as full as
that afforded by a collective bargaining contract.
53 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). It would seem that petitions to state and
local governments as well as to the federal government are protected. State constitutions
also protect the right to petition. E.g., N.Y. CoNsr. art. I, § 9; ILL. CONSr. art. II, § 17.
54 See Note, supra note 7, 1965 WIs. L. REv. at 678-79. Arguably there is only a right
to petition as a citizen, not as an employee, but it would be difficult to determine in what
capacity a citizen was requesting better pay for teachers if he were both a teacher and
a resident of the school district, possibly with school age children.
55 4 A.D. 117, 163 N.YS.2d 476 (1957), aff'd, 4 N.Y.2d 866, 150 N.E.2d 705, 174
N.Y.S.2d 234 (1958).
56 This notion is supported by the close relationship between the right to petition and
the right to assemble. Some courts treat both as one right. See, e.g., De Jonge v. Oregon,
299 U.S. 353 (1937). There is remakably little authority discussing the right to petition.
57 Were the government obligation less, the right to petition would be indistinguishable from the right to free speech. See Brown, The Right to Petition: Political or Legal
Freedom?, 8 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 729, 732-33 (1961).
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with employees; refusal to negotiate with minority groups, accordingly,
should not be unconstitutional.
An additional argument for the constitutionality of contractual
limits on representation rights is that since the government must be
free to establish reasonable procedures for hearing grievances, it may,
while permitting all groups to present grievances, require that the
grievances be presented through the agency of a certified representative, the majority union.
III. CONCLUSION

Because of the absence of any clear indication of the General Assembly's intent respecting collective bargaining power in the sections
of the School Code of 1961 relating to the Chicago Board of Education,
the Board's need for such power must be examined to determine
whether it can be implied. Such an examination suggests that the assistance collective bargaining power might provide in relieving teacher
discontent is such that a court would be justified in either inferring
or denying such power. A court otherwise prepared to find implied
collective bargaining power should not be discouraged by the illusory
problem of, "delegation of power," but the duration of the contract
should be limited to the one year period during which the Board retains the same membership. An exclusive representation provision
would not deny equal protection to minority teachers, nor would it
unconstitutionally deny the right to petition if the Board at least
examines suggestions made by minority unions.

